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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1998, Congress passed the Protection of Children from Sex-
ual Predators Act (Protection Act)
1
 to suppress the growing wave of 
sexual predators using Internet chat rooms to lure minors into sexual 
encounters.
2
  Congress intended the Protection Act to be “a compre-
hensive response to the horrifying menace of sex crimes against 
children, particularly assaults facilitated by computers.”3 
In the years since Congress passed the Protection Act, courts 
have resolved many of the legal challenges posed against it (and 
against similar laws that Congress enacted) to protect minors from 
online predators.
4
  Courts, however, have yet to definitively resolve 
what actions constitute an attempt under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), which 
prohibits attempts to “persuade[], induce[], entice[], or coerce[]” a 
minor to engage in illegal sexual activity.
5
  Although the courts have 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2007, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin.  The author would like to thank Professor John Kip Cornwell for all 
of his guidance. 
 1 Pub. L. No. 105-314, 112 Stat. 2974 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 2 See Protection Act, pmbl., 112 Stat. at 2974. 
 3 H.R. REP. NO. 105-557, at 10 (1998), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 678.  
See also United States v. Nestor, 574 F.3d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that Con-
gress enacted § 2422(b) as “part of an overall policy to aggressively combat comput-
er-related sex crimes against children”). 
 4 Courts now universally agree that even if a defendant chats not with a real mi-
nor but with a law-enforcement agent posing as one, the defendant may still be con-
victed for attempting to lure a minor into a sexual encounter.  See United States v. 
Helder, 452 F.3d 751, 754–56 (8th Cir. 2006).  Courts have also upheld many of the 
provisions of the Protection Act in the face of constitutional challenges.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 5 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006).  See Tyler Patrick Lovejoy, Comment, A New Play-
ground: Sexual Predators and Pedophiles Online: Criminalizing Cyber Sex Between Adults and 
Minors, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 311, 322 (2008) (raising unresolved questions regard-
ing attempt liability under § 2422(b)). 
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consistently held that the evidence that prosecutors present in a typi-
cal sting-operation case provides overwhelming support for an at-
tempt conviction under § 2422(b),6 courts have not conclusively de-
termined the minimal evidence necessary to uphold an attempt 
conviction under the statute. 
A number of circuits have recently addressed the issue of when a 
predator advances from merely chatting with a minor online to 
committing a crime under § 2422(b).7  In a series of 2008 cases, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit introduced a concrete-
measures standard, which requires a defendant to commit some 
“concrete” action beyond talking with a minor online.8  The contours 
of this standard, however, remain undefined.  The Seventh Circuit 
applied the concrete-measures standard to uphold the conviction of a 
defendant who discussed the possibility of meeting a minor for a 
“date” on a specific day and at a certain time.9  Prior to that decision, 
the Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction of a defendant who sent a 
minor online messages explicitly describing sex acts he could per-
form on her along with a video of himself masturbating.
10
  Other cir-
cuits appear to have imposed lower evidentiary standards in recent 
§ 2422(b) attempt cases11 but have not established clear standards to 
follow in subsequent cases.  Although these decisions help provide 
guidance, they do not define a precise test to determine the minimal 
 
 6 See United States v. Hensley, 574 F.3d 384, 391 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that a 
typical sting-operation case provided “more than enough [evidence] for a jury to 
find a ‘substantial step’” under § 2422(b)); United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 204 
(2d Cir. 2006); infra Part II.B (describing a typical sting-operation case). 
 7 See United States v. Sheridan, 304 F. App’x 742, 745 (10th Cir. 2008) (inter-
preting 18 U.S.C. app. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(E) (2006), which mirrors the language of 
§ 2422(b)); United States v. Zawada, 552 F.3d 531, 532 (7th Cir. 2008); United States 
v. Pierson, 544 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Joseph, 542 F.3d 13, 14 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
 8 Zawada, 552 F.3d at 534 (citing United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 649–50 
(7th Cir. 2008)). 
 9 Id. at 535. 
 10 Gladish, 536 F.3d at 651. 
 11 See United States v. Nestor, 574 F.3d 159, 161 (3d Cir. 2009) (listing several ac-
tions that could individually “constitute a substantial step toward the violation of 
§ 2422(b),” including posting an online advertisement “seeking sexual contact with 
children” and engaging in repeated online and telephone discussions about “having 
sexual contact with children”); United States v. Sheridan, 304 F. App’x 742, 745 
(10th Cir. 2008) (holding that online conversations about “virginity, sexual expe-
riences, and a defendant’s desire to engage in sexual activity” with a minor “are, by 
themselves, evidence of an attempt to persuade, induce or entice”). 
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evidence necessary to convict a predator for an attempt under 
§ 2422(b). 
This Comment will argue that courts should interpret § 2422(b) 
in a way that promotes the Protection Act’s goal: to make the Inter-
net safer for minors by prohibiting predators from using the Internet 
to lure children into dangerous sexual encounters.
12
  Specifically, this 
Comment will propose that the key factual issue underlying current 
§ 2422(b) precedent is whether the defendant encouraged or invited a 
minor to engage in illegal sexual activity.  An encouragement stan-
dard provides courts with a precise test to determine whether suffi-
cient evidence exists to convict a defendant of an attempt under 
§ 2422(b).  The standard also advances the legislative intent behind 
§ 2422(b). 
Neither the encouragement standard nor current precedent, 
however, supports convicting a predator under § 2422(b) for having 
cybersex
13
 with a minor, which involves many of the same harms Con-
gress intended to target and prevent under § 2422(b).  To prohibit 
cybersex with minors, courts should break away from current 
precedent and broaden the interpretation of “entice” to include 
speech that makes illegal sexual activity more appealing to minors. 
Part II of this Comment will examine the legislative history be-
hind § 2422(b), which reflects Congress’s intent to target cyberpreda-
tors interacting with minors online.  It will also summarize the signifi-
cant legal issues that courts have resolved regarding § 2422(b) and 
identify the important questions that courts have left unanswered.  In 
Part III, this Comment will argue that a proper interpretation of 
§ 2422(b) requires courts to distinguish an attempt to persuade a mi-
nor to engage in illegal sexual activity from an attempt to engage in 
sexual activity with a minor.  Applying this distinction, this Comment 
will argue that a defendant commits an attempt under § 2422(b) 
when he encourages or invites a minor to take action necessary to 
engage in illegal sexual activity.  The encouragement standard, how-
ever, is not sufficient to criminalize cybersex with minors.  Instead, 
Part IV of this Comment will argue that courts should broaden the 
interpretation of “entice” to prohibit a defendant’s attempt to make 
illegal sexual activity more appealing to minors. 
 
 12 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-557, at 10–12 (1998), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
678, 678–81. 
 13 Cybersex is defined as “simulating sex via sexual communication over the In-
ternet.”  United States v. Joseph, 542 F.3d 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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II. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY BEHIND § 2422(B) 
A. The Legislative History Behind § 2422(b) Reflects Congress’s 
Concerns About Cyberpredators Interacting with Minors Online 
Prior to 1996, the scope and purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 2422 fo-
cused on whether an individual was persuaded to cross state lines to 
engage in an illegal sexual activity.
14
  This approach has its roots in 
the Mann Act of 1910.
15
  According to § 2422’s legislative history, its 
first version was based on 18 U.S.C. § 399 (1940), the precursor of 
which was § 3 of the Mann Act.16  The first version of § 2422 prohi-
bited “knowingly persuad[ing], induc[ing], entic[ing], or coerc[ing] 
any woman or girl to go from one place to another in interstate or 
foreign commerce . . . for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, 
or for any other immoral purpose.”17  Congress significantly revised 
the Mann Act in 1986 in an attempt to modernize the text of the sta-
tute.
18
  Similar to the revisions that it made to other sections of the 
Mann Act, Congress made § 2422 gender neutral and eliminated the 
outdated “debauchery” and “immoral purpose” language.19  The fo-
cus of § 2422, however, remained on whether an individual per-
 
 14 Prior to its 1996 revision, § 2422 read, 
Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any indi-
vidual to travel in interstate [or] foreign commerce, or in any Territory 
or Possession of the United States, to engage in prostitution, or in any 
sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal of-
fense, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five 
years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 2422 (Supp. IV 1986) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (2006)). 
 15 White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, §§ 1–8, 36 Stat. 825, 825–27 (1910) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–2424 (2006)). 
 16 See 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (1952) (noting in the legislative history that the section 
was based on 18 U.S.C. § 399 (1940), the precursor of which was § 3 of the Mann 
Act) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (2006)). 
 17 Id.  The modern version of § 2422, however, does not address persuading, in-
ducing, enticing, or coercing minors.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a)–(b) (2006).  Rather, 
the modern version of § 2422 prohibits the separate crimes of transporting minors 
across state lines for illegal sexual activity and traveling across state lines to engage in 
illegal sexual activity with minors.  See id. 
 18 See Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, 100 
Stat. 3510 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); H.R. REP. NO. 99-
910, at 3, 7–8 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5952, 5953, 5957–58 (“The bill 
rewrites the Mann Act . . . to eliminate its anachronistic features and to make it 
gender neutral. . . .  Similarly, sections 2422 and 2423 are rewritten in modern form . 
. . .”). 
 19 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (Supp. IV 1986) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (2006)).  
See H.R. REP. NO. 99-910, at 8. 
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suaded another individual to travel across state lines to engage in an 
illegal sexual activity.
20
 
The scope and purpose of § 2422 underwent a significant shift in 
1996 when Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(Telecommunications Act).
21
  As an attachment to the Telecommuni-
cations Act, Congress amended § 2422 by adding § 2422(b).22  The 
new subsection specifically targeted the persuasion of minors, elimi-
nated the prior version’s requirement of “travel in interstate [or] for-
eign commerce,” and added an attempt provision.23  Significantly, 
Congress shifted the focus of § 2422(b) from whether a person per-
suaded an individual to travel across state lines to whether a person 
used a facility of interstate commerce to persuade, or attempt to per-
suade, a minor to engage in an illegal sexual activity.
24
  The 1996 ver-
sion of § 2422(b) read, 
Whoever, using any facility or means of interstate or foreign 
commerce, including the mail, . . . knowingly persuades, induces, 
entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 
18 years to engage in prostitution or any sexual act for which any 
person may be criminally prosecuted, or attempts to do so, shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or 
both.
25
 
The current version of § 2422(b) reads substantially the same as the 
1996 version except that Congress has raised the statutory penalty for 
violating the subsection.
26
 
 
 20 See 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (Supp. IV 1986). 
 21 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.). 
 22 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Supp. II 1996) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) 
(2006)). 
 23 Id. 
 24 See id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006).  Congress has revised § 2422(b) three times since 
1996 and each time raised the penalty for violating the statute.  The maximum pris-
on sentence under the original version of § 2422(b) was ten years.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2422(b) (Supp. II 1996).  In 1998, Congress raised the maximum sentence for vi-
olating § 2422(b) to fifteen years.  18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Supp. IV 1998) (current ver-
sion at 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006)).  In 2003, Congress added a statutory minimum 
of five years imprisonment for violating § 2422(b) and a statutory maximum of thirty 
years imprisonment.  18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Supp. III 2003) (current version at 18 
U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006)).  Finally, in 2006, Congress raised the statutory minimum 
for violating § 2422(b) to ten years imprisonment and the maximum sentence to life 
imprisonment.  18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006). 
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Although enacted in 1996, the most comprehensive legislative 
history for § 2422(b) came in 1998 when Congress passed the Protec-
tion Act.
27
  Its legislative history reflects Congress’s concerns about 
cyberpredators interacting with minors online.  Congress emphasized 
many of the dangers posed by cyberpredators developing online rela-
tionships with minors, including the possibility of cyberpredators 
manipulating and exploiting minors.
28
  Congress highlighted the po-
tential consequences of allowing cyber-relationships between preda-
tors and minors: 
 Recent, highly publicized news accounts in which pedophiles 
have used the Internet to seduce or persuade children to meet 
them to engage in sexual activities have sparked vigorous debate 
about the wonders and perils of the information superhighway.  
Youths who have agreed to such meetings have been kidnapped, 
photographed for child pornography, raped, beaten, robbed, and 
worse.
29
 
Congress intended the Protection Act to counteract the growing wave 
of sex crimes facilitated by predators interacting with minors online.
30
  
Congressional representatives emphasized that the aim of the Protec-
tion Act was to punish “pedophiles who stalk children on the Inter-
net.”31  Congresswoman Jennifer Dunn was one of many representa-
tives who forcefully asserted that the purpose of the Protection Act 
was to target cyberpredators who victimize children.  During debate, 
Dunn stated that “[b]y severely punishing those who use computers 
to target children for sexual acts or who knowingly send children ob-
 
 27 Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-314, 
112 Stat. 2974 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).  See United 
States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 467 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) (“There is very little legislative 
history pertaining to the first version of § 2422(b), which was attached to the Tele-
communications Act of 1996.  Because the Child Protection and Sexual Predator Pu-
nishment Act of 1998 rewrote § 2422(b) and made substantial changes to related 
laws, we find the Congressional findings related to that act to be more relevant 
here.”); see also United States v. Nestor, 574 F.3d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing 
legislative history of the Protection Act). 
 28 Congress noted that “‘cyber-predators’ often ‘cruise’ the Internet in search of 
lonely, rebellious or trusting young people.  The anonymous nature of the on-line 
relationship allows users to misrepresent their age, gender, or interests.  Perfect 
strangers can reach into the home and befriend a child.”  H.R. REP. NO. 105-557, at 
11–12 (1998), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 680. 
 29 Id. at 12. 
 30 Congress intended the Protection Act to be “a comprehensive response to the 
horrifying menace of sex crimes against children, particularly assaults facilitated by 
computers.”  Id. at 10. 
 31 Id. at 12. 
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scenity over the Internet, this bill cracks down on cyber predators and 
pedophiles.”32 
Further demonstrating Congress’s intent to criminalize the on-
line interaction between sexual predators and minors, the initial draft 
of the Protection Act contained a provision that prohibited predators 
from contacting (or attempting to contact) minors “for the pur-
pose[] of engaging in any sexual activity.”33  During debate, congres-
sional representatives discussed the importance of the provision and 
its underlying purpose of preventing predators from interacting with 
minors online.  Representative Bill McCollum stated, 
 The key portion of this bill, and there are a lot of other things 
in it, is to make sure when there is contact made over the Internet 
for the first time by a predator like this with a child, with the in-
tent to engage in sexual activity, whatever that contact is, as long 
as the intent is there to engage in that activity, he can be prose-
cuted for a crime.
34
 
But both the House and Senate ultimately rejected the contact provi-
sion because it was too broad.
35
 
Despite rejecting the proposed contact provision, Congress con-
tinued to indicate that the primary goal of § 2422(b) remained to 
target and punish sexual predators who interact with minors online 
and attempt to lure the minors into dangerous sexual encounters.  
After striking down the proposed contact provision, congressional 
representatives continued to declare their intent to “crack down” on 
 
 32 144 CONG. REC. H4491, 4492–93 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (statement of Rep. 
Dunn). 
 33 H.R. 3494, 105th Cong. § 2422(c) (as reported by House, Mar. 23, 1998). 
 34 144 CONG. REC. H4497 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (statement of Rep. McCol-
lum).  Echoing Representative Bill McCollum’s sentiments, Representative Sheila 
Jackson-Lee stated that the Protection Act “would be a start to effectively prevent a 
predator from initiating a harmful relationship with a child for illegal sexual activity 
and to subjecting children to damaging pornographic material that our children can 
currently access.”  Id. at 4493 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee). 
 35 See H.R. 3494, 105th Cong. § 2422 (as reported by House, Oct. 13, 1998) 
(amending previous versions of the Protection Act by erasing the proposed “contact” 
provision).  During debate, Representative Alcee Hastings explained why the “con-
tact” provision was rejected: 
     The original House bill was also too broad in that it made it a crime 
to contact or attempt to contact a minor.  This was so broad that it 
would have covered a simple “hello” in an Internet chat room.  Target-
ing attempts to make contact is like prosecuting a thought crime. 
144 CONG. REC. H10566, H10572 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Hast-
ings).  See also 144 CONG. REC. S10518-02, 10521 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1998) (statement 
of Sen. Leahy) (stating reasons for rejecting the proposed “contact” provision). 
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cyberpredators.
36
  Senator Orrin Hatch articulated Congress’s prima-
ry concerns when he stated that Congress “must also be vigilant in 
seeking to ensure that the Internet is not perverted into a hunting 
ground for pedophiles and other sexual predators, and a drive-
through library and post office for purveyors of child pornography.”37  
Representative Jerry Weller stated Congress’s intent more bluntly: 
“[W]e need to do everything we can to ensure that the weirdos, the 
whackos, the slimeballs, those who would use the latest technology to 
prey on children and their families, are stopped.”38  The legislative 
history reflects Congress’s intent to target the middle ground be-
tween “a simple ‘hello’ in an Internet chat room”39 and arranging 
real-life sexual encounters with minors via online messaging. 
B. Courts Have Consistently Upheld § 2422(b) in the Face of Legal 
Impossibility and Constitutional Challenges 
Intended to help law enforcement catch sexual predators who 
use the Internet to target and lure minors into dangerous sexual en-
counters,
40
 § 2422(b) is often used by prosecutors to charge and con-
vict sexual predators caught in sting operations.  The typical case 
arises when the predator initiates an online conversation with a law-
 
 36 144 CONG. REC. H10566, 10574 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. 
Dunn).  For example, during debate, Representative Alcee Hastings stated, “The leg-
islation makes a number of important changes, principally by targeting pedophiles 
who stalk children on the Internet and by cracking down on pedophiles who use and 
distribute child pornography to lure children into sexual encounters.”  Id. at 10571–
72 (statement of Rep. Hastings). 
 37 144 CONG. REC. S12257, 12262 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch). 
 38 144 CONG. REC. H10566, 10572 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. 
Weller). 
 39 Id. (statement of Rep. Hastings). 
 40 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-557, at 10 (1998), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 
678.  The House Report stated, 
As we usher in the computer age, law enforcement will be confronted 
with even newer challenges.  The “Child Protection and Sexual Preda-
tor Punishment Act” seeks to address those challenges by providing law 
enforcement with the tools it needs to investigate and bring to justice 
those individuals who prey on our nation’s children. 
Id.  Representative Scott Hutchinson reiterated those sentiments during debate: 
“H.R. 3494 provides law enforcement with the tools it needs to investigate and bring 
to justice those individuals who prey on our Nation’s children and sends a message to 
those individuals who commit these heinous crimes that they will be punished swiftly 
and severely.”  144 CONG. REC. H10566, 10571 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of 
Rep. Hutchinson). 
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enforcement agent posing as a minor.
41
  The predator proceeds to 
discuss performing sex acts with the purported minor and suggests 
meeting the purported minor in person.
42
  After the predator and 
purported minor arrange to meet in person, the predator travels to 
the meeting place where he is arrested by awaiting law enforcement.
43
 
One of the recurring issues that courts initially confronted when 
adjudicating typical sting-operation cases was whether the accused 
predators could raise a successful legal impossibility defense.
44
  A pre-
dator caught in a sting operation would often claim that he could not 
be convicted of an attempt under § 2422(b) because he attempted to 
persuade an undercover officer who was an adult—not a minor—to 
engage in sexual activity.
45
  The predator argued that if he successfully 
persuaded the undercover officer to have sex with him, he would not 
be guilty of a crime because consensual sex between two adults is le-
gal.
46
 
Courts, however, have consistently rejected legal impossibility as 
a valid defense to an attempt charge under § 2422(b).47  Some courts 
reject the defense by recharacterizing it as a factual impossibility de-
 
 41 See, e.g., United States v. Cochran, 534 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 42 See id. 
 43 See United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2008).  Many other 
cases follow this typical fact pattern.  See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 575 F.3d 801 
(8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Chaudhry, 321 F. App’x 119 (3d Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Cherer, 513 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 
140 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Cote, 504 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2007); United States 
v. Yost, 479 F.3d 815 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 
2006); United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Blazek, 
431 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945 (10th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Naiden, 424 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Thomas, 410 
F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Patten, 397 F.3d 1100 (8th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Meek, 366 
F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Panfil, 338 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Farner, 251 
F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 44 Legal impossibility occurs when “the intended acts, even if completed, would 
not amount to a crime.”  United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(quoting United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 188 (3d Cir. 1973)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
 45 See, e.g., United States v. Helder, 452 F.3d 751, 753 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 46 See id. 
 47 See id. at 755 (joining other circuits in holding that “an actual minor victim is 
not required for an attempt conviction under § 2422(b)”). 
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fense,
48
 which courts generally consider an invalid defense to crimi-
nal-attempt charges.
49
  Other courts reluctantly accept the predator’s 
legal impossibility defense for the sake of argument and then reject it 
on the basis of legislative intent by holding that Congress did not in-
tend for legal impossibility to constitute a defense to an attempt 
charge under § 2422(b).50  Although courts differ about the reasons 
for rejecting the defense, legal impossibility clearly is not an effective 
defense to an attempt under § 2422(b).51  In general, to obtain an at-
tempt conviction under § 2422(b), courts only require prosecutors to 
show that the defendant believed that he was communicating with a 
minor.
52
 
In adjudicating attempt charges under § 2422(b), courts have al-
so confronted federal constitutional challenges under the First 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
53
  Courts have roundly rejected these challenges and have held 
that the statute does not infringe on protected speech and is not un-
constitutionally vague or overbroad.
54
  Courts consistently hold that 
 
 48 Factual impossibility “occur[s] when extraneous circumstances unknown to the 
actor or beyond his control prevent consummation of the intended crime.”  Hsu, 155 
F.3d at 199 (quoting Berrigan, 482 F.2d at 188)). 
 49 See United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 959–60 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[F]actual 
impossibility is generally not a defense to criminal attempt because success is not an 
essential element of attempt crimes. . . .  [I]t is not a defense to an offense involving 
enticement and exploitation of minors that the defendant falsely believed a minor to 
be involved.” (quoting United States v. Hankins, 127 F.3d 932, 934 (10th Cir. 1997))) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 50 See United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 466 (3d Cir. 2006).  After noting 
“that the distinction between factual and legal impossibility is essentially a matter of 
semantics,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that “[e]ven assum-
ing that this is a case of legal impossibility, it is well established in this Court that the 
availability of legal impossibility as a defense to a crime is a matter of legislative in-
tent.”  Id. at 465–66.  The Third Circuit went on to “conclude that Congress did not 
intend to allow the use of an adult decoy, rather than an actual minor, to be asserted 
as a defense to § 2422(b).”  Id.  See also United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 719 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (finding that a legal impossibility defense to § 2422(b) would frustrate the 
statute’s purpose of allowing law enforcement “to police effectively the illegal in-
ducement of minors for sex”). 
 51 See United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 202 n.20 (2d Cir. 2006) (summarizing 
circuit court decisions rejecting the legal impossibility defense in § 2422(b) cases). 
 52 See United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[The defen-
dant’s] belief that a minor was involved is sufficient to sustain an attempt conviction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).”). 
 53 See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 54 See United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Because no 
protected speech would be chilled by § 2422(b), and because the statute’s terms are 
sufficiently unambiguous, we conclude that § 2422(b) is not unconstitutionally vague 
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the First Amendment does not provide a right to attempt to persuade 
a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity; thus, § 2422(b) does not 
risk criminalizing legitimate speech and is not unconstitutionally 
broad.
55
  Furthermore, in the context of § 2422(b), courts routinely 
define the terms “persuade,” “entice,” “coerce,” and “induce” ac-
cording to their plain meanings, which are not unconstitutionally va-
gue.
56
 
C. Courts Have Not Yet Resolved What Constitutes an Attempt Under 
§ 2422(b) 
Although courts have seemingly resolved the constitutional and 
legal impossibility challenges to § 2422(b), they have not established 
a clear standard to determine the threshold level of evidence needed 
to convict a defendant for an attempt under the statute.  Often pre-
sented with more than enough evidence in the typical sting-operation 
case to convict the defendant for an attempt under § 2422(b),57 
courts decline to entertain arguments that the defendant committed 
an attempt before he arranged a meeting place with a minor or tra-
veled to the meeting place.
58
  Courts often mark a defendant’s “sub-
stantial step” toward attempting a crime under § 2422(b) as the mo-
ment he arranges to meet the minor in person.
59
  These same courts, 
however, leave open the possibility that the defendant’s online inte-
raction with the minor would have supported an attempt conviction 
 
or overbroad.”); Bailey, 228 F.3d at 639 (“No . . . overbreadth or ambiguity problems 
exist with 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).”). 
 55 See United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 473 (3d Cir. 2006) (“There is no 
First Amendment right to persuade minors to engage in illegal sex acts.”); United 
States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 721 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The inducement of minors to en-
gage in illegal sexual activity enjoys no First Amendment protection.”); Bailey, 228 
F.3d at 639 (“Put another way, the Defendant simply does not have a First Amend-
ment right to attempt to persuade minors to engage in illegal sexual acts.”). 
 56 Gagliardi, 506 F.3d at 147–48; Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 473. 
 57 See, e.g., United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 204 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 58 See, e.g., Gagliardi, 506 F.3d at 150–51 (declining, because of the overwhelming 
evidence presented in the case, to reach the government’s argument that the defen-
dant committed an attempt under § 2422(b) before he appeared at an arranged 
meeting place). 
 59 United States v. Thomas, 410 F.3d 1235, 1246 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Thomas 
crossed the line from ‘harmless banter’ to inducement the moment he began mak-
ing arrangements to meet angelgirl12yo, notwithstanding the lack of evidence that 
he traveled to the supposed meeting place.”). 
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on its own even if the defendant never arranged a meeting with the 
minor.
60
 
Without establishing a clear standard to determine the threshold 
level of evidence necessary to convict a defendant for an attempt un-
der § 2422(b), courts have left unresolved significant issues regarding 
the statute.  Primarily, courts have not determined whether a preda-
tor’s online interaction with a minor is alone sufficient to implicate 
the predator under § 2422(b) or whether additional acts, such as ar-
ranging a meeting place with the minor or traveling to the meeting 
place, are necessary to do so.
61
 
Recent circuit court decisions provide some guidance in forming 
a clear standard to determine the threshold level of evidence needed 
to establish an attempt under § 2422(b).  In United States v. Bailey, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld a conviction under 
the statute even though the defendant never arranged to meet the 
minors whom he contacted online.
62
  The evidence presented in the 
case demonstrated that the defendant contacted the minors online, 
“urged [them] to meet him, and used graphic language to describe 
how he wanted to perform oral sex on [them].”63  The Sixth Circuit 
concluded that the defendant’s conduct constituted an attempt un-
der § 2422(b),64 which “require[d] a finding that the defendant had 
an intent to persuade or to attempt to persuade.”65  The Sixth Circuit 
upheld the defendant’s conviction for an attempt based solely on 
evidence of the defendant’s online interaction with the minors.66 
Although confronted with a fact pattern similar to Bailey, the Se-
venth Circuit in United States v. Gladish overturned a defendant’s con-
viction under § 2422(b) based on the defendant’s online interaction 
with a purported minor.
67
  The defendant in Gladish solicited for sex 
an undercover government agent posing as a minor in an Internet 
 
 60 See id. (“Thomas took a substantial step in an attempt to induce, entice, and 
persuade by writing and sending his insistent messages.”). 
 61 Most courts appear to agree that a defendant does not have to travel to an ar-
ranged meeting place to sustain a conviction under § 2422(b).  See United States v. 
Yost, 479 F.3d 815, 820 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Thomas, 410 F.3d at 1246; 
United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639–40 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 62 See 228 F.3d  at 639–40. 
 63 Id. at 639. 
 64 See id. at 640. 
 65 Id. at 639. 
 66 See id. at 639–40. 
 67 See 536 F.3d 646,  651 (7th Cir. 2008). 
PAZUNIAK (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2010  4:58 PM 
2010] COMMENT 703 
 
chat room.
68
  The defendant discussed the possibility of traveling to 
meet the purported minor; however, law enforcement arrested the 
defendant before the defendant and the minor made arrangements 
to meet.
69
  The Seventh Circuit overturned the defendant’s convic-
tion because 
the fact that the defendant in the present case said to a stranger 
whom he thought a young girl things like “ill suck your titties” 
and “ill kiss your inner thighs” and “ill let ya suck me and learn 
about how to do that,” while not “harmless banter,” did not indi-
cate that he would travel to northern Indiana to do these things 
to her in person; nor did he invite her to meet him in southern 
Indiana or elsewhere.
70
 
Following its Gladish decision, the Seventh Circuit in United States 
v. Zawada introduced the concrete-measures standard to determine 
when a predator moves beyond “mere talk in an Internet chat room” 
and commits an attempt under § 2422(b).71  The Seventh Circuit ap-
plied this standard in Zawada to uphold the conviction of a defen-
dant who, with a purported minor, “had a relatively concrete conver-
sation about making a ‘date’” during which the defendant spoke 
about “a specific date and time of day that . . . would work.”72  Al-
though the defendant never arranged a specific meeting place or 
time, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the action that the defen-
dant took “[was] somewhat closer to a substantial step than the ‘hot 
air’ and nebulous comments about meeting ‘sometime’ that took 
place in Gladish.”73 
Although the Bailey and Seventh Circuit decisions may appear 
contradictory, a common factual issue underlies the courts’ rulings.  
In Bailey, the Sixth Circuit relied on evidence that the defendant 
“urged” the minors to meet him and engage in illegal sexual activi-
ty.
74
  The Seventh Circuit based its Zawada decision on similar evi-
dence that the defendant essentially invited the purported minor to 
meet him for a sexual encounter.
75
  Conversely, the Seventh Circuit 
reversed a defendant’s conviction in Gladish because he did not ex-
 
 68 See id. at 648. 
 69 See id. 
 70 Id. at 650. 
 71 552 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 72 Id. at 535. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639–40 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 75 See Zawada, 552 F.3d at 535. 
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tend a similar invitation.
76
  The common issue underlying these cases 
was whether the defendant encouraged or invited the minor to en-
gage in illegal sexual activity.  As the following analysis will demon-
strate, current precedent supports the application of the encourage-
ment standard to determine whether a defendant’s actions constitute 
an attempt under § 2422(b). 
III. THE ENCOURAGEMENT STANDARD 
To conduct a proper § 2422(b) analysis, courts must first recog-
nize that § 2422(b) does not require a defendant to demonstrate an 
intent to actually engage in illegal sexual activity with a minor.  Ra-
ther, a defendant violates § 2422(b) by merely attempting to persuade 
a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity.  When courts properly 
recognize this distinction, the key factual issue that emerges in 
§ 2422(b) attempt cases is whether the defendant encouraged or in-
vited the minor to take action that is necessary to participate in illegal 
sexual activity.  This encouragement standard not only finds support 
in current precedent, but it also satisfies the requirements of the sub-
stantial-step test that federal courts apply. 
A. Section 2422(b) Does Not Require Proof that the Defendant 
Attempted to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity with a Minor 
Section 2422(b) prohibits attempts to “persuade[], induce[], en-
tice[], or coerce[]” a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity,77 a 
crime that most courts have carefully distinguished from an attempt 
to actually participate in illegal sexual activity with a minor.
78
  Rather 
than prohibiting an attempt to engage in illegal sexual activity with a 
minor, “[§] 2422(b) criminalizes an intentional attempt to achieve a 
mental state—a minor’s assent—regardless of the accused’s intentions 
vis-à-vis the actual consummation of sexual activities with the mi-
 
 76 See United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 77 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006). 
 78 See United States v. Goetzke, 494 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that 
the defendant “was charged with attempting to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce [the 
minor] to engage in sexual activity with him—not with attempting to engage in sexual 
activity with [the minor]”); United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 202 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“A conviction under § 2422(b) requires a finding only of an attempt to entice or an 
intent to entice, and not an intent to perform the sexual act following the persua-
sion.”); United States v. Thomas, 410 F.3d 1235, 1244 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Sec-
tion 2422(b) requires only that the defendant intend to entice a minor, not that the 
defendant intend to commit the underlying sexual act.”). 
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nor.”79  In other words, § 2422(b) does not criminalize a predator’s 
attempt to have sex with a child; it criminalizes the predator’s at-
tempt to talk a child into it.  Section 2422(b) targets the predator’s 
attempt at persuasion—at convincing a minor to engage in illegal 
sexual activity—not the predator’s attempt to perform illegal sex acts 
with a minor. 
Courts have recognized that Congress, in passing § 2422(b), 
identified an attempt to persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual 
activity as a separate crime from an attempt to actually engage in il-
legal sexual activity with a minor.
80
  The legislative history reflects 
Congress’s concerns about predators using the Internet to persuade 
minors to participate in illegal sexual activity.  For example, during 
debate on the Protection Act, Representative Scott Hutchinson 
stated, 
 We are seeing numerous accounts in which pedophiles have 
used the Internet to seduce or persuade children to meet them to 
engage in sexual activities.  Children who have been persuaded to 
meet their new online friend face-to-face have been kidnapped, 
raped, photographed for child pornography, or worse.  Some 
children have never been heard from again.
81
 
Representative Kay Granger recounted an incident in Houston, Texas 
that demonstrates the risks involved in predators communicating 
with minors online to attempt to persuade the minors to engage in 
illegal sexual activity: 
Even scarier still, many of these predators use cyberspace to meet 
children and ask them out.   
 Earlier this year a South Houston teenager ran away to see 
someone she never met before.  That night Edward Dub Watson 
sexually assaulted her.  And why did she leave home to see this 
person?  Because she talked to him on the Internet, and she 
thought he sounded like a nice person.   
 
 79 United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 
2961 (2008); see also Goetzke, 494 F.3d at 1236 (describing an attempt to persuade un-
der § 2422(b) as “an attempt to achieve the mental act of assent”). 
 80 See United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Congress has 
made a clear choice to criminalize persuasion and the attempt to persuade, not the 
performance of the sexual acts themselves.”). 
 81 144 CONG. REC. H10571 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Hutchin-
son).  Reiterating those sentiments, Representative Benjamin Gilman stated, “The 
Internet, although a remarkable source of information and knowledge, makes it all 
too easy for pedophiles to illegally contact our children and engage in inappropriate 
communication and contact with them.”  Id. at 10574 (statement of Rep. Gilman). 
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 This is the issue we are trying to deal with.  It is sick, and it has 
simply got to stop.
82
 
Other representatives highlighted additional dangers and risks asso-
ciated with predators interacting with minors online, such as the 
anonymity with which predators can communicate with minors.
83
  
This legislative history indicates Congress’s goal of not only prevent-
ing a predator’s attempt to have sexual relations with a minor but al-
so of targeting and criminalizing the online interaction through 
which predators persuade minors to engage in illegal sexual activity.  
Congress intended to treat the attempt to persuade as a wholly sepa-
rate crime. 
Adhering to the plain language of § 2422(b) and the legislative 
intent behind it, courts have recognized that the statute does not ad-
ditionally require the defendant’s intent for the illegal sexual activity 
to actually take place.
84
  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit stated in United States v. Dwinells, “Congress fully intended to treat 
acts like those attributed to the appellant with the utmost gravity, 
whether or not the accused intended that the enticed sex acts be con-
summated.”85  The First Circuit noted that while some courts “have 
mentioned the defendant’s intent to engage in sexual acts, . . . such a 
finding was not necessary.”86  The Sixth Circuit in Bailey likewise diffe-
rentiated between an intent to persuade from an intent to engage: 
While it may be rare for there to be a separation between the in-
tent to persuade and the follow-up intent to perform the act after 
persuasion, they are two clearly separate and different intents and 
 
 82 144 CONG. REC. H4497 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (statement of Rep. Granger). 
 83 See 144 CONG. REC. H10574 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Dunn).  
Representative Jennifer Dunn stated, 
     But what about cyber-predators?  They may live anywhere; in our 
neighborhood, in another state, across the country, and yet they still 
have access to our children.  These predators think that they can hide 
behind the faceless, voiceless world of the Internet.  Make no mistake, 
they are wrong.   
     . . . . 
     [The Protection Act] will ensure that cyber-predators become real 
live prisoners by providing law enforcement with the tools it needs to 
bring to justice those who would prey on our children. 
Id. 
 84 United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 
2961 (2008).  See also United States v. Yost, 479 F.3d 815, 819 n.3 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(stating that a defendant does not need to act “with the specific intent to engage in 
sexual activity” to be guilty of an attempt under § 2422(b)). 
 85 508 F.3d at 69. 
 86 Id. at 70. 
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the Congress has made a clear choice to criminalize persuasion 
and the attempt to persuade, not the performance of the sexual 
acts themselves.
87
 
The Bailey and Dwinells decisions demonstrate that an intent to per-
suade a minor under § 2422(b) does not require an additional intent 
to engage in illegal sexual activity. 
Despite Congress’s purpose to distinguish an attempt to per-
suade a minor to engage in sexual activity from an attempt to actually 
engage in illegal sexual activity, some courts misinterpret § 2422(b) 
and mistakenly blend the two crimes.  For example, in upholding an 
attempt conviction under § 2422(b) in United States v. Farner, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that the defendant “in-
tended to engage in sexual acts with a 14-year-old girl and that he 
took substantial steps toward committing the crime.”88  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit similarly upheld a defen-
dant’s conviction under § 2422(b) in United States v. Muentes because 
the defendant “attempted to stimulate or cause a minor to engage in 
sex with him.”89  By framing the issue in terms of whether the defen-
dant attempted to engage in sexual activity with a minor, the Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits misinterpreted the purpose of § 2422(b), 
which is to criminalize the predator’s attempt to persuade a minor ra-
ther than the predator’s intent to engage in illegal sexual relations 
with a minor.
90
  Section 2422(b) does not require a defendant to 
demonstrate his intent to engage in illegal sexual activity with a mi-
nor. 
After its Gladish decision, the Seventh Circuit introduced its con-
crete-measures standard to determine whether a defendant made an 
attempt under § 2422(b).91  The Seventh Circuit had left a significant 
middle ground between the conduct that it dismissed as “hot air” in 
Gladish, which it held did not constitute an attempt under 
§ 2422(b),92 and the “arranged meeting place” scenarios, which it 
held did constitute an attempt under § 2422(b).93  The Seventh Cir-
cuit began to define the contours of that middle ground in Zawada 
 
 87 United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 88 251 F. 3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 89 316 F. App’x 921, 924 (11th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 90 See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006). 
 91 United States v. Zawada, 552 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 92 United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 93 See id. at 649. 
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and its companion case, United States v. Davey.
94
  Referring to and 
building on its holding in Gladish that “mere talk in an Internet chat 
room is not enough to support a conviction for an attempt” under 
§ 2422(b),95 the Seventh Circuit held that “more concrete meas-
ures . . . are necessary.”96  These measures include “making arrange-
ments for meeting the (supposed) girl, agreeing on a time and place 
for a meeting, making a hotel reservation, purchasing a gift, or travel-
ing to a rendezvous point.”97  The Seventh Circuit applied the con-
crete-measures standard to affirm the conviction of a defendant who 
chatted with a purported minor online and discussed the possibility 
of meeting her for a sexual encounter but never arranged a specific 
meeting place and time.
98
 
The Seventh Circuit’s concrete-measures standard, however, re-
flects a misinterpretation of § 2422(b).  Although the factors the 
court highlighted pertain to whether a predator intended to actually 
have sex with a minor, they do not necessarily indicate a defendant’s 
attempt to persuade.  A predator who reserves a hotel room or ar-
ranges a specific meeting place may indicate his intent to have a sex-
ual encounter with a minor, but § 2422(b) does not target a preda-
tor’s attempt to have sex with a minor.  Rather, § 2422(b) 
criminalizes a predator’s attempt to convince a minor to have sex, 
which may be accomplished solely through online interaction and 
without any of the concrete steps that the Seventh Circuit listed. 
By treating an attempt to persuade similarly to an attempt to en-
gage, courts impose unnecessarily high evidentiary standards to con-
vict a predator of attempting to persuade a minor under § 2422(b).  
If courts frame the issue in terms of whether the predator intended 
to engage in illegal sexual activity with a minor, then courts require 
evidence that the defendant attempted to actually have sex with a 
minor.  For example, in United States v. Hicks, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court’s decision to 
dismiss an indictment that charged the defendant with an attempt 
under § 2422(b).99  In remanding the case back to the district court, 
the Eighth Circuit stated that a “defendant may be convicted of an 
attempt to violate § 2422(b) if he or she attempts, by use of the In-
 
 94 550 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 95 Zawada, 552 F.3d at 534. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. (citing Gladish, 536 F.3d at 649). 
 98 See id. at 535. 
 99 See 457 F.3d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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ternet, to engage in criminal sexual activity with a person under the 
age of eighteen.”100  Thus, rather than instruct the district court to 
analyze whether the allegations sufficiently showed that the defen-
dant attempted to persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, 
the Eighth Circuit improperly instructed the court to analyze whether 
the allegations sufficiently demonstrated that the defendant at-
tempted to engage in illegal sexual activity with a minor.  Sec-
tion 2422(b), however, does not target a predator’s attempt to have 
sex with a minor; it only targets his attempt to persuade. 
B. A Predator Attempts to Persuade a Minor in Violation of § 2422(b) 
When He Encourages or Invites the Minor to Engage in Illegal 
Sexual Activity 
Federal courts apply the substantial-step test to determine 
whether a defendant committed a criminal attempt.
101
  Under this 
test, a defendant “must intend the completed crime and take a ‘sub-
stantial step’ toward its completion.”102  In United States v. Manley, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained that a “sub-
stantial step” is 
something more than mere preparation, yet may be less than the 
last act necessary before the actual commission of the substantive 
crime.  In order for behavior to be punishable as an attempt, it 
need not be incompatible with innocence, yet it must be neces-
sary to the consummation of the crime and be of such a nature 
that a reasonable observer, viewing it in context could conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that it was undertaken in accordance 
with a design to violate the statute.
103
 
 
 100 Id. at 840. 
 101 See, e.g., Gladish, 536 F.3d at 648; United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 202 (2d 
Cir. 2006); United States v. Thomas, 410 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 102 Gladish, 536 F.3d at 648.  See also United States v. Muentes, 316 F. App’x 921, 
923–24 (11th Cir. 2009) (“To sustain a conviction for the crime of attempt, the Gov-
ernment need only prove (1) the defendant had the specific intent to engage in the 
criminal conduct for which he is charged and (2) he took a substantial step toward 
commission of the offense.”); Brand, 467 F.3d at 202 (“[T]he government must prove 
that the defendant had the intent to commit the crime and engaged in conduct 
amounting to a ‘substantial step’ toward the commission of the crime.”). 
 103 632 F.2d 978, 987–88 (2d Cir. 1980) (citation omitted).  Other circuits have 
frequently cited the Second Circuit’s definition of a substantial step.  See, e.g., Gladish, 
536 F.3d at 648 (quoting Manley, 632 F.2d at 988); Brand, 467 F.3d at 202 (quoting 
Manley, 632 F.2d at 987–88). 
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Federal courts adopted the substantial-step test from the Model 
Penal Code,
104
 which defines a “substantial step” as conduct that “is 
strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose.”105  The code 
drafters explained that the substantial-step test’s focus is on “what the 
actor has already done” and added that simply because “further ma-
jor steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not 
preclude a finding that the steps already undertaken are substan-
tial.”106  The code drafters intended the substantial-step test to facili-
tate the “apprehension of dangerous persons” and “to stop the crim-
inal effort at an earlier stage, thereby minimizing the risk of 
substantive harm.”107  In the context of enticement crimes, the code 
drafters stated that “the act of enticement is demonstrative of a rela-
tively firm purpose to commit the crime and clearly indicates the 
dangerousness of the actor.”108 
A predator can attempt to attain a minor’s assent to engage in il-
legal sexual activity through words alone.
109
  In Dwinells, the First Cir-
cuit found that the defendant’s sexually explicit online conversations 
with purported minors, which included the defendant’s “vague 
promises” to visit them, constituted sufficient evidence to uphold the 
defendant’s attempt conviction under § 2422(b) even though the de-
fendant never arranged a specific meeting place with the purported 
minors.
110
  The Sixth Circuit also upheld an attempt conviction in Bai-
ley based solely on the defendant’s online interaction with minors.111  
Relying exclusively on the predator’s online conversations with the 
minors, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the defendant “contacted 
[the minors], urged [them] to meet him, and used graphic language 
to describe how he wanted to perform oral sex on [them].”112  The 
Sixth Circuit held that the online conversations indicated the defen-
dant’s “intent to persuade or to attempt to persuade” and that the 
 
 104 See Manley, 632 F.2d at 987. 
 105 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (1962). 
 106 Id.§ 5.01 note 6(a). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. § 5.01 note 6(b)(ii). 
 109 See, e.g., United States v. Nestor, 574 F.3d 159, 161 (3d Cir. 2009) (listing re-
peated email and telephone conversations about “having sexual contact with child-
ren” among the activities that “[i]ndividually . . . could constitute a substantial step 
toward the violation of § 2442(b)”). 
 110 United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 67, 73 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied 128 S. 
Ct. 2961 (2008). 
 111 See United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639–40 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 112 Id. at 639. 
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evidence drawn from the online conversations was sufficient to 
uphold the defendant’s attempt conviction under § 2422(b).113 
Most courts properly hold that a predator may demonstrate his 
specific intent to persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity 
through online interactions.
114
  As the Dwinells and Bailey decisions 
demonstrate, however, a sexual predator may indicate his intent to 
persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity and take a sub-
stantial step toward committing a crime under § 2422(b) by simply 
chatting with a minor online even if the predator never arranges an 
actual meeting.  A key fact the Sixth Circuit mentioned in Bailey was 
that the defendant not only engaged in sexually explicit conversa-
tions with minors, but that he also urged the minors to contact him to 
arrange a meeting.
115
 
Bailey is one of a handful of cases suggesting that the key factual 
issue in a § 2422(b) attempt case is whether the defendant encouraged 
or invited the minor to take action that is necessary to engage in illeg-
al sexual activity.  In Bailey, the minors would have had to meet with 
the defendant for the defendant to perform oral sex on them.
116
  
Thus, the defendant demonstrated his intent to persuade the minors 
to engage in an illegal sexual activity when he encouraged them to 
call him to arrange a meeting.
117
  Reflecting a proper interpretation 
of § 2422(b), the Sixth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to 
support a conviction for attempting to persuade a minor
118
 even 
though it would most likely not support a conviction for attempting 
to engage in illegal sexual activity with a minor. 
Similar to Bailey, both the Zawada and Gladish decisions turned 
on the issue of whether the defendant encouraged or invited the 
purported minor to engage in illegal sexual activity.  Although the 
Seventh Circuit introduced the concrete-measures standard to test 
the sufficiency of evidence in a § 2422(b) attempt case,119 the key fac-
tual determination in both Zawada and Gladish was whether the de-
 
 113 Id. at 639–40. 
 114 See Nestor, 574 F.3d at 161 (“Nestor evinced his intent to violate § 2422(b) in his 
e-mails and phone conversations.”); United States v. Schmitz, 322 F. App’x 765, 768 
(11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the defendant demonstrated her specific intent to vi-
olate § 2422(b) by sending “messages expressing her love and desire to pursue a sex-
ual relationship with the minor”). 
 115 See Bailey, 228 F.3d at 639. 
 116 See id. 
 117 See id. 
 118 See id. at 640. 
 119 See United States v. Zawada, 552 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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fendant encouraged or invited the purported minor to meet for a 
sexual encounter.  In upholding the defendant’s conviction in Zawa-
da, the Seventh Circuit contrasted the defendant’s conduct with the 
conduct at issue in Gladish.
120
  In Gladish, the Seventh Circuit empha-
sized that the defendant neither invited the purported minor to visit 
him nor suggested that he visit the minor.
121
  In Zawada, however, the 
defendant essentially invited the purported minor out for a “date” 
with the implication that they would have sex.
122
  As the Seventh Cir-
cuit emphasized,
123
 the key fact distinguishing Zawada from Gladish 
was the defendant’s invitation. 
Evidence of an invitation to engage in illegal sexual activity was 
also integral to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s de-
cision in United States v. Sheridan, in which the defendant “invited [a 
purported minor] to come to Colorado in order to perform various 
sex acts with him, which [the defendant] wanted to photograph.”124  
The defendant received an increased sentence for “distribution to a 
minor that was intended to persuade, induce, [or] entice . . . the mi-
nor to engage in any illegal activity,”125 which the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed.
126
  Although the defendant never arranged a meeting with the 
purported minor, the Tenth Circuit concluded that  “[c]onversations 
with a minor about virginity, sexual experiences, and a defendant’s 
desire to engage in sexual activity with her are, by themselves, evidence 
of an attempt to persuade, induce or entice.”127  The Sheridan decision 
not only supports the principle that online interaction with a minor 
may, on its own, establish a defendant’s intent to persuade, but that 
the key factual issue in § 2422(b) attempt cases is whether the defen-
dant encouraged or invited the minor to engage in illegal sexual ac-
tivity. 
These courts are correct to question whether a defendant en-
couraged or invited a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity be-
cause a defendant who does so satisfies the requirements of the Mod-
 
 120 See id. at 535. 
 121 See United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 122 Zawada, 552 F.3d at 535. 
 123 See id. (noting that the defendant’s “relatively concrete conversation about 
making a ‘date’” is “somewhat closer to a substantial step than” the conduct in Gla-
dish). 
 124 304 F. App’x 742, 745 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 125 See id. at 743. 
 126 Id. at 745. 
 127 Id. (emphasis added). 
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el Penal Code’s substantial-step test.128  When a predator encourages 
or invites a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, he places the 
decision of whether to accept or reject the suggestion squarely in the 
hands of the minor.  This demonstrates both the predator’s “relative-
ly firm purpose to” persuade a minor as well as his dangerousness129 
because the predator indicates his willingness to accept the minor’s 
possible acquiescence, which would complete the criminal act of per-
suasion under § 2422(b).  The predator will have “achieve[d] a mental 
state—a minor’s assent.”130  Furthermore, by encouraging and invit-
ing a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, the predator creates 
the impression that he wants the minor to agree to a sexual encoun-
ter, which augments the predator’s demonstration of dangerousness.  
The predator not only creates the possibility that a minor will agree 
to a sexual encounter, but he also increases the likelihood that the 
minor will agree to the encounter by influencing her to say yes. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Goetzke
131
 demonstrates how encouraging or inviting a 
minor to engage in illegal sexual activity can constitute a substantial 
step toward committing a crime under § 2422(b).  In Goetzke, the de-
fendant sent letters to a minor that “described the sex acts that [the 
defendant] wanted to perform on [the minor].”132  The court found 
that “the letters were crafted to appeal to [the minor], flatter him, 
impress him, and encourage him to come back to Montana ‘maybe 
this summer’ when school was out.”133  The court stated that “[t]he 
letters essentially began to ‘groom’ [the minor] for a sexual encoun-
ter in the event he returned to Montana.”134 
Based on the letters, the Ninth Circuit upheld the defendant’s 
conviction under § 2422(b) and concluded that “the letters fit neatly 
within the common understanding of persuade, induce, or entice.”135  
The court stated that “when a defendant initiates conversation with a 
minor, describes the sexual acts that he would like to perform on the 
minor, and proposes a rendezvous to perform those acts, he has 
 
 128 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (1962). 
 129 See id. § 5.01 note 6(b)(ii). 
 130 United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 
2961 (2008). 
 131 494 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 132 Id. at 1236. 
 133 Id. at 1235. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
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crossed the line toward persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a 
minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity.”136  The Ninth Circuit fur-
ther concluded that “physical proximity or travel” was not necessary 
to constitute a substantial step under § 2422(b).137 
The defendant’s letters alone provided sufficient evidence to 
uphold a § 2422(b) attempt conviction because they encouraged and 
invited the minor to engage in illegal sexual activity.
138
  Recognizing 
that § 2422(b) does not require a defendant to arrange a meeting 
with a minor, the Ninth Circuit found it irrelevant that the minor 
never agreed to return to Montana or have a sexual encounter with 
the defendant.
139
  Section 2422(b) merely requires an attempt to per-
suade, and the letters were part of the defendant’s scheme to accom-
plish that goal.  Designed to elicit a positive response from the mi-
nor,
140
 the letters not only presented an opportunity for the minor to 
agree to a sexual encounter, but they also encouraged him to do so.  
The defendant’s encouragement reflected his intent to persuade the 
minor because it demonstrated that the defendant wanted and active-
ly tried to convince the minor to return to Montana for a sexual en-
counter.
141
  The defendant’s encouragement caused his conduct to 
“‘cross the line between preparation and attempt.’”142 
Goetzke’s reasoning applies with equal force in the context of on-
line solicitation of minors.  Just as a predator may send letters to a 
child encouraging him to engage in illegal sexual activity, a predator 
may send a child an instant message or email encouraging the same 
conduct.  The Seventh Circuit implicitly accepted Goetzke’s applicabil-
ity in the online context in Gladish, a case that involved the online so-
licitation of minors, by distinguishing Goetzke for reasons other than 
the different modes of communication involved in the two cases.
143
 
 
 136 Id. at 1237. 
 137 Goetzke, 494 F.3d at 1236. 
 138 See id. at 1235. 
 139 See id. at 1236. 
 140 As the Ninth Circuit described, “[Goetzke] sent [the minor] letters replete 
with compliments, efforts to impress, affectionate emotion, sexual advances, and 
dazzling incentives to return to Montana, and proposed that [the minor] return dur-
ing the upcoming summer.  In short, Goetzke made his move.”  Id. at 1237 (footnote 
omitted). 
 141 See id. 
 142 Id. (quoting United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 143 See United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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IV. A “MORE APPEALING” INTERPRETATION OF “ENTICE” 
Although the encouragement standard provides a clear test for 
courts to apply in § 2422(b) attempt cases, the standard would not 
protect against the full range of harms that Congress intended to tar-
get under the statute.  For example, cybersex between online preda-
tors and children poses many significant risks, but it would likely fall 
outside the scope of the encouragement standard.  In order to crimi-
nalize cybersex with minors, courts should broaden their interpreta-
tion of “entice” under § 2422(b) to encompass conduct that makes 
illegal sexual activity more appealing to minors. 
A. The Encouragement Standard Would Not Prohibit Cybersex with 
Minors, Which Poses Many of the Same Risks Congress Intended to 
Prevent Under § 2422(b) 
Even if courts applied the encouragement test to determine 
whether a predator committed an attempt under § 2422(b), cybersex 
with minors would most likely still fall outside the scope of § 2422(b).  
A predator could engage in a sexually explicit online conversation 
with a minor without ever encouraging or inviting the minor to en-
gage in any illegal sexual activity.  Courts also appear reluctant to in-
terpret § 2422(b) to prohibit cybersex with minors.  For example, the 
Second Circuit concluded in United States v. Joseph that the statute did 
not encompass cybersex with minors.
144
  The Second Circuit reasoned 
that cybersex is merely conduct that makes sexual activity “more ap-
pealing” and declined to adopt a “more appealing” interpretation of 
“entice” under § 2422(b).145 
Courts, however, should adopt an interpretation of § 2422(b) 
that criminalizes cybersex with minors because it poses many of the 
same dangers Congress intended to prevent under the statute.  
Among the new laws enacted under the Protection Act, Congress 
created 18 U.S.C. § 1470, which prohibits the transfer of obscene ma-
 
 144 See 542 F.3d 13, 18 & n.4 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 145 Id. at 18.  After noting that “the offense remains ‘enticing,’ and making a sex-
ual act ‘more appealing’ in the absence of an intent to entice is not a crime,” the 
Second Circuit stated, 
If jurors thought that [the defendant] only wanted to make “Julie” 
think that sexual conduct with him would be appealing, but did not in-
tend to entice her to engage in such conduct with him, they would 
have convicted him for having cybersex conversation, which is not a 
crime, but not for violating section 2422(b). 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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terial (including child pornography) to minors.
146
  Congress enacted 
§ 1470 to prohibit predators from sending minors child pornography 
to help lure the minors into sexual encounters.
147
  During debate on 
the Protection Act, Congress often noted that online predators send 
minors child pornography to lower their inhibitions and condition 
them for a sexual encounter.
148
  Predators may engage in cybersex 
with minors for the same reasons.  Cybersex, like child pornography, 
serves a predator’s purpose of sexualizing the relationship and 
“grooming” the minor for a sexual encounter, which often precedes 
child sexual abuse.
149
  Courts have often recognized this danger and 
“have noted the government’s ‘interest in preventing pedophiles 
from “grooming” minors for future sexual encounters.’”150 
In Joseph, the Second Circuit raised the issue of whether cybersex 
conversations with minors violate § 1470, but the court did not have 
an opportunity to formally rule on the matter.
151
  Such conduct, how-
ever, would most likely fall outside the scope of § 1470 because the 
statute was intended to prohibit the transfer of child pornography 
and other related materials to a child.
152
  Based on the legislative his-
tory, § 1470 does not appear to implicate the direct online interac-
tion between a predator and a minor. 
 
 146 18 U.S.C. § 1470 (1998); H.R. 3494, 105th Cong. § 1470 (as reported by House, 
Oct. 20, 1998). 
 147 During debate on the Protection Act, Representative Alcee Hastings stated, 
“The legislation makes a number of important changes, principally by targeting pe-
dophiles who stalk children on the Internet and by cracking down on pedophiles 
who use and distribute child pornography to lure children into sexual encounters.”  
144 CONG. REC. H10566, 10571–72 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Hast-
ings). 
 148 For example, Representative Bill McCollum noted, “Often used to break down 
inhibitions and introduce and validate specific sex acts as normal to a child, pedo-
philes frequently send pictures to young people to gauge a child’s interest in a rela-
tionship.”  144 CONG. REC. H4491, 4491 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (statement of Rep. 
McCollum). 
 149 United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 203 (2d Cir. 2006) (“‘Child sexual abuse 
is often effectuated following a period of “grooming” and the sexualization of the 
relationship.’” (quoting Sana Loue, Legal and Epidemiological Aspects of Child Maltreat-
ment, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 471, 479 (1998))). 
 150 Id. (quoting Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 151 See United States v. Joseph, 542 F.3d 13, 18 n.4 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Cybersex con-
versation constituting the transfer of ‘obscene matter’ via the Internet to a person 
under 16 might well violate 18 U.S.C. § 1470, but [the defendant] was not charged 
with that offense.”). 
 152 See 144 CONG. REC. H10566, 10571–72 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of 
Rep. Hastings). 
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B. In Order to Criminalize Cybersex with Minors, Courts Should Adopt 
a “More Appealing” Interpretation of “Entice” Under § 2422(b) 
Under current U.S. law, the best approach for courts to take in 
order to criminalize cybersex with minors is to adopt the “more ap-
pealing” interpretation of “entice” that the Second Circuit rejected in 
Joseph.
153
  Although Congress did not enact the proposed contact pro-
vision,
154
 protecting minors from online predators remained the pri-
mary goal of the Protection Act.
155
  A “more appealing” interpretation 
would advance that goal by allowing courts to convict predators for 
having cybersex with minors, which raises the same concerns that 
prompted Congress to outlaw distributing child pornography to mi-
nors: predators attempting to break down a child’s inhibitions and 
sexualize their relationship with a child.
156
 
Case law from a number of circuits supports an interpretation of 
“entice” under § 2422(b) that includes speech intending to make 
more appealing to the minor the prospect of meeting the predator 
for a sexual encounter.
157
  For example, in United States v. Tykarsky, the 
defendant interacted online with the purported minor on numerous 
occasions and “described, in explicit detail, the sexual acts that he 
hoped to perform with her.”158  The Third Circuit stated that the pre-
dator’s interaction with the purported minor “provide[d] sufficient 
evidence that [the defendant] took substantial steps toward ‘persuad-
ing, inducing, enticing or coercing’ a minor to engage in sexual activ-
ity.”159  Likewise, in United States v. Brand, the defendant chatted with 
 
 153 See Joseph, 542 F.3d at 18–19 (rejecting the “more appealing” interpretation of 
“entice” under § 2422(b)). 
 154 See H.R. 3494, 105th Cong. § 2422 (as reported by House, Oct. 13, 1998). 
 155 H.R. REP. NO. 105-557, at 10 (1998), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 678. 
 156 See 144 CONG. REC. H4491, 4491 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (statement of Rep. 
McCollum). 
 157 See United States v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2009) (describing how 
the defendant “promised [the purported minor] a modeling career, to spoil her rot-
ten, to make her feel good, and to treat her like a queen” as evidence of the defen-
dant’s attempt to persuade); United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 73–74 (1st Cir. 
2007) (stating the defendant’s “promise of a quarter-million-dollar life insurance pol-
icy . . . would serve as a very powerful enticement to a thirteen-year-old girl who 
lacked enough money even to travel to Boston”), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 2961 (2008); 
United States v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865, 869–70 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Munro’s statements 
that he had money, his own place, a car, an Xbox, a Play Station 2, and a DVD player 
could reasonably be interpreted as attempts to impress Chantelle and give her incen-
tives to meet and engage in sexual activities with Munro.”). 
 158 446 F.3d 458, 461 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 159 Id. at 469. 
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two purported minors online, shared photos with them, flirted with 
them, and attempted to gain their affection.
160
  Noting that the de-
fendant’s interaction with the purported minors “constituted classic 
‘grooming’ behavior in preparation for a future sexual encounter,”161 
the Second Circuit concluded that “[t]hese sexually explicit conver-
sations with ‘Julie’ provided overwhelming evidence to support the 
jury’s finding that [the defendant] attempted to entice a minor.”162 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Goetzke also supports the adop-
tion of a “more appealing” interpretation of “entice” under 
§ 2422(b).  Relying on the letters that the defendant sent the minor, 
the Ninth Circuit upheld the defendant’s attempt conviction.163  The 
court emphasized that “the letters were crafted to appeal to [the mi-
nor], flatter him, impress him.”164  The letters essentially demonstrated 
the defendant’s attempt to make a sexual encounter more appealing 
to the minor. 
Had it adopted the “more appealing” interpretation of “entice,” 
the Seventh Circuit could have upheld the defendant’s conviction in 
Gladish for an attempt under § 2422(b).  By describing in graphic de-
tail the sex acts that he wanted to perform on the purported minor 
and by emphasizing his intent to teach the minor about sex,
165
 the de-
fendant essentially tried to make the prospect of a sexual encounter 
more appealing to the minor. 
If courts apply the “more appealing” interpretation of “entice,” 
§ 2422(b) could still withstand First Amendment scrutiny because of 
its scienter and intent requirements.
166
  As the Ninth Circuit stated in 
United States v. Dhingra, “The statute’s intent provision, coupled with 
the requirement that the purpose of the conduct must be for crimi-
nal sexual activity, sufficiently excludes legitimate activity, including 
speech, from its scope.”167 
 
 160 See 467 F.3d 179, 203 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 See United States v. Goetzke, 494 F.3d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 164 Id. at 1235 (emphasis added). 
 165 See United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 166 See, e.g., United States v. Dhingra, No. 03-10001, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15288, 
at *9–10 (9th Cir. June 8, 2004) (“[Section] 2422(b) does not chill legitimate speech 
because the scienter and intent requirements of the statute sufficiently limit criminal 
culpability to reach only conduct outside the protection of the First Amendment.”). 
 167 Id. at *11. 
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Although courts have consistently held that speech attempting 
to persuade minors to engage in illegal sexual activity receives no 
First Amendment protection, courts have recognized a “fantasy” or 
“role-playing” defense in which the defendant claims that he thought 
he was merely engaging in a mutual fantasy with another adult.
168
  
Neither a “fantasy” nor a “role-playing” defense, however, poses a 
First Amendment threat to an interpretation of § 2422(b) that de-
fines “entice” as making sexual conduct more appealing.  Sec-
tion 2422(b) only implicates speech that a predator “knowingly” di-
rects toward a minor.
169
  This requirement would insulate § 2422(b) 
against First Amendment challenges, even if courts apply a “more 
appealing” interpretation of “entice” under § 2422(b).170  The know-
ledge requirement imposes a formidable obstacle to defendants who 
want to challenge their § 2422(b) charge on First Amendment 
grounds.  As the Ninth Circuit noted in United States v. Meek, “The age 
and purpose clauses insulate from liability persons engaged in consti-
tutionally permissible speech, such as sexually explicit conversations 
between two adults, because conversations of that nature would not 
involve the narrow category of criminal sexual activity with a mi-
nor.”171 
Policy considerations also weigh in favor of adopting a “more 
appealing” interpretation of “entice” under § 2422(b).  Such a stan-
dard would provide law enforcement with an earlier opportunity to 
interrupt a predator’s online interaction with a child so that law en-
forcement may prevent the predator from arranging a potentially 
dangerous meeting with the child.  The current standard forces law 
enforcement to expend valuable time and resources devising elabo-
rate sting operations to catch online predators.
172
  These operations 
take time to develop and allow predators to continue to chat online 
 
 168 See United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir. 2007) (“The appellant’s 
chief defense—that he was merely role-playing and thought that the communications 
were mutually entertained fantasies, comfortably remote from any prospect of con-
summation—is plausible.”), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2961 (2008).  But see United States 
v. Cherer, 513 F.3d 1150, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2008) (addressing defendant’s role-
playing defense, but rejecting it on the merits). 
 169 See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006). 
 170 See United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 721 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The potential for 
unconstitutional chilling of legitimate speech disappears because § 2422(b) requires 
the prosecution to prove that a defendant actually knows or believes that the specific 
target of the inducement is a minor.”). 
 171 366 F.3d at 722. 
 172 See cases cited supra note 43. 
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with children and to persuade them to meet for sexual encounters 
while law enforcement conducts undercover investigations.  The 
quicker law enforcement may intervene, the safer vulnerable children 
will be while engaging in online activity. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The challenge in determining when a predator takes a substan-
tial step toward committing a crime under § 2422(b) is trying to har-
monize the statute’s intent requirement with its legislative goals.  The 
legislative history behind the Protection Act reflects Congress’s ef-
forts to aggressively respond to online sex crimes targeting children 
and to protect minors from online predators who might lure minors 
into dangerous sexual encounters.
173
  To fall under the scope of 
§ 2422(b), however, a predator must still demonstrate his intent to 
persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity.
174
 
Recent case law suggests that the key factual issue in § 2422(b) 
attempt cases is whether the defendant encouraged or invited a mi-
nor to engage in illegal sexual activity.  Circuit courts have based 
their decisions to uphold or overturn a § 2422(b) conviction on evi-
dence that the defendant “urged” a minor to perform illegal sex 
acts,
175
 asked a minor out for a “date,”176 or sent flattering letters in an 
effort to tempt a minor into having a sexual encounter.
177
  The en-
couragement standard provides courts with a precise test to deter-
mine whether sufficient evidence supports the conviction of a defen-
dant for attempting to persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual 
activity. 
But the encouragement standard is ultimately inadequate to de-
termine whether a predator committed an attempt under § 2422(b) 
because cybersex with minors would likely remain beyond the sta-
tute’s reach.  Posing many of the same risks that Congress intended 
to prevent by passing the Protection Act,
178
 cybersex with minors must 
 
 173 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-557, at 10 (1998), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 
678; 144 CONG. REC. H10566, 10571–72 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statements of Reps. 
Hastings & Weller). 
 174 See United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639–40 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 175 Id. at 639. 
 176 United States v. Zawada, 552 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 177 See United States v. Goetzke, 494 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 178 See United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 203 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Loue, su-
pra note 59, at 479); 144 CONG. REC. H4491, 4491 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (state-
ment of Rep. McCollum). 
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be criminalized.  But because engaging in cybersex with children is 
well beyond the scope of other statutes, cybersex will likely remain le-
gal unless courts bring it within the reach of § 2422(b).  Although 
Congress could revise the statute to explicitly address cybersex, Con-
gress has already provided the courts with sufficient statutory tools to 
criminalize cybersex now. 
To bring cybersex with minors within the scope of § 2422(b), 
courts should adopt an interpretation of “entice” that includes 
speech that makes sexual activity “more appealing” to minors.  A 
“more appealing” interpretation of “entice” would withstand consti-
tutional challenges under the First Amendment because of the sta-
tute’s intent requirement.179  Many § 2422(b) sting-operation cases 
provide support for a “more appealing” interpretation of “entice” by 
relying on evidence that the defendant attempted to make sexual ac-
tivity more appealing to a minor.
180
 
In sum, courts should interpret § 2422(b) in a way that promotes 
the primary goal of the Protection Act—to make the Internet safer 
for minors.  Throughout the 1998 debates, members of Congress rei-
terated their concerns about faceless cyberpredators using pornogra-
phy and sexually explicit speech to lure minors into dangerous sexual 
encounters.
181
  A broader interpretation of § 2422(b) will allow prose-
cutors to target predators who have cybersex with minors or who use 
other online communication to break down children’s inhibitions 
and bait them into participating in illegal sexual activity.  Innocent 
children need this protection and deserve the adoption of a legal 
standard that will provide it. 
 
 179 See United States v. Dhingra, No. 03-10001, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15288, at *9–
10 (9th Cir. June 8, 2004). 
 180 See United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 73–74 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 
S. Ct. 2961 (2008); United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 461 (3d Cir. 2006); Unit-
ed States v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865, 869–70 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 181 See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H10566, 10571 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of 
Rep. Hutchinson). 
